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Is a trade union an undertaking under EU competition law?  
 
Abstract 
 
EU Competition law applies to undertakings.  The status of a trade union under EU 
competition law is a contentious issue. In this paper, I argue that trade unions, contrary to 
existing CJEU jurisprudence, can be classified as “undertakings” when engaged in collective 
bargaining.  Current case law argues that trade unions act as their members’ agent when 
engaged in collective bargaining.  As workers are not undertakings under EU competition 
law, trade unions are not either.  This paper argues primarily that a trade union is an 
undertaking and that Court’s approach on the agent-principal question is wrong.  It further 
argues that a trade union is an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining as they 
provide, and/or offer their services on a given market. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The concept of an undertaking in competition law “makes it possible to determine the 
category of actors to which the competition rules apply.”1  The classification of a trade union 
as an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining is highly contentious.  Such a 
definition would subject collective agreements between an employer (or employers’ 
association) and a trade union to analysis under Article 101 TFEU.  However, current CJEU 
case law argues that a trade union, when engaged in collective bargaining, is not an 
undertaking for the purposes of competition law.2  Such a finding questions the need for the 
Albany exemption.  If a trade union is not an undertaking when engaged in collective 
bargaining, then there is no need for an exemption: competition law would simply not 
apply.  In Albany, the Court held that collective agreements are exempt from EU 
                                                          
 Thanks to Professor Morten Hviid, Professor Gareth Thomas, Professor Andreas Stephan and Dr Sebastian 
Peyer, and those who I have not mentioned, for their comments on this paper.  Mistakes remain mine alone. 
1 Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 446, 
[AG206] 
2 See Albany (n.1); Case C-22/98 Criminal Proceedings Against Jean Claude Becu [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 96; Case C-
413/13 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Netherlands [2014] E.C.R. 00 
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competition rules where such an agreement is agreed between management and labour (or 
their representatives) and has as its objective improving conditions of work and 
employment.3  In the Court’s opinion, applying competition to collective agreements would 
undermine the social policy objectives inherent within such agreements.  This paper, 
however, argues that the Court erred in arguing that a trade union is not an undertaking. 
This paper argues that the CJEU errs in their arguments that a trade union is not an 
undertaking for the purposes of EU competition law, and that under a strict application of 
competition law, a trade union is an undertaking.  This question is important because it has 
implications not only for the need for an exemption, but also for the role of collective 
bargaining as a form of worker protection.  Whilst trade unions provide a diverse number of 
services – ranging from collective bargaining to running supermarkets and travel agents – its 
core function is still the protection of its members’ interest.  Competition law could be used 
as a tool to challenge and undermine worker representation and trade unions.4  Trade 
unions becoming liable in damages for any anti-competitive collective agreements could 
lead to situations such as in Taff Vale becoming the norm.5  Furthermore, applying 
competition law to collective bargaining reduces legal certainty for employers, employees 
and unions themselves.  Can collective agreements be relied upon if they can be ex-post 
declared void?  In addition, declaring a collective agreement void post-implementation 
causes significant inroads into trade union freedom and the right to collective bargaining 
under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950.6  As seen in Demir v 
Turkey, the retroactive voiding of a collective agreement was a breach of the right to 
collective agreement.7  Retrospective voiding under EU competition rules has the same 
potential risk.  In addition, it must be pointed out that this article does not suggest a return 
                                                          
3 Albany, [59-]-[60] 
4 See, for example, Loewe v Lawlor 208 US 274 (1908) for illustration of the early application of the Sherman 
Act in the United States to labour union. 
5 Taff Vale Railway Co v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] A.C. 426 
6 This is also the case potentially for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union O.J. C 326, 
26.10.2012.  See Article 28 which states that “Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, 
in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreement at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend 
their interests, including strike action.” 
7 Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2009) 48 E.H.R.R 54.  In Demir, the ECtHR held that the ex-post voiding of a 
collective agreement and requirement for individual trade union members to repay the benefits obtained 
(wage increase) under the agreement, was an infringement on the right to collective bargaining under Article 
11 ECHR. 
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to the position under the common law: that trade unions are illegal as a combination in 
restraint of trade.8  This position in remedied by statute which removes the common law 
from applying to trade unions.9  The arguments presented below argue do not comment, or 
assess, whether competition law “should” apply, to which the restraint of trade literature is 
more suitable. 
However, such effects are unlikely to happen.  Leaving the exemption in Albany to 
one side, finding that a trade union is an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining 
does not mean that an agreement is anti-competitive, or that the social objectives 
contained in collective agreements will be ignored.  In order for an agreement to be anti-
competitive under Article 101(1), it must either have the object or effect of restricting 
competition.  Where there are countervailing efficiencies which outweigh any potential 
restrictions of competition, the parties can argue that the agreements should be exempted 
by Article 101(3). 
Within the European Union, there is a wide divergence of collective bargaining 
models affecting aspects of collective bargaining such as their enforceability,10 and the level 
at which bargaining takes place.11  Different models will affect whether a trade union, when 
engaged in collective bargaining, is an undertaking or not.  The following discussion shall 
focus on a decentralised, firm-level bargaining system.   The reason for this being that this 
closely resembles the UK industrial relations system.  However, where helpful to do so, 
discussion will make use of other models, particularly the German model of collective 
bargaining. 
 
Therefore, the following model will form the base of the analysis in the following sections. 
 
                                                          
8 See Hornby v Close (1867) 10 Cox CC 393.  The Court held that trade unions were unlawful associations in so 
far as their objects included the raising of wages and the control of labour in the trades in which their 
members worked. 
9 See ss. 2 and 3, Trade Union Act 1871; more recently, s.11 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) 
Act 1992.  The common law on restraint of trade has developed significantly since the 1870’s and  
10 Compare the UK, where collective agreements are presumed to be not legally enforceable against either 
party to it, and simply form a “gentleman’s agreement”; see s.179 Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992; Ford Motor Co Ltd. v Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers 
[1969] 2 All E.R. 481; with Germany whereby collective agreements are legally enforceable. 
11 For example, a decentralised bargaining system occurs within the UK, whereas in the Benelux and central 
European countries, bargaining is at a more centralised level. 
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Union A is recognised by Firm X to engage in collective bargaining.  Membership 
of Union A is voluntary, with members being required to pay a subscription fee 
to the union.  Fees are set on a sliding scale according to wage bands.  Collective 
bargaining takes place at firm level, with any collective agreement is assumed to 
be legally unenforceable. 
 
In section 2, the paper shall argue that the existing case law is wrong.  It will argue that a 
trade union does act as its members’ agent when engaged in collective bargaining and 
therefore can be an undertaking in its own right.  This paper shall then examine, in section 
3, whether a trade union can be an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining.  It 
will argue that collective bargaining is an economic activity.  In sections 4 and 5, the paper 
will examine whether collective bargaining is either a public function or a solidarity function 
respectively.  The sections will argue that neither applies, and will confirm that collective 
bargaining is an economic undertaking.  Section 6 will conclude the paper – concluding that 
a trade union is an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining. 
 
2. Is a trade union an undertaking: the agent-principal issue? 
 
Previous judicial discussion of whether a trade union is an undertaking when engaged in 
collective bargaining argues that a trade union is not an undertaking for the purposes of 
competition law.12  Such argument appears premised on the basis that the union acts as 
agent of its members, and not in its own right.  As an individual member, when employed is 
not an undertaking for the purposes of EU competition law, then the union, as its members’ 
agent, is not an undertaking.  An agent is a “legal or physical person vested with the power 
to negotiate and/or conclude contracts on behalf of another person (the principal), either in 
the agent's own name or in the name of the principal” for the sale or purchase of goods or 
services of the principle.13  Where the agent bears no, or an insignificant, risk, of the relation 
                                                          
12 See Albany (n.1); Becu (n.2); FNV Kunsten (n.2) 
13 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010) O.J. C 130/01, [12] 
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to the contracts “concluded and/or negotiated” on behalf of the principle,14 the agent and 
principal form a single economic unit: the agent is an auxiliary organ.15 
This section will argue that the reasoning adopted by the Courts is incorrect.  It 
questions, first, whether the union does act as its members’ agent given the model set out 
in the introduction; and second, whether when engaged in collective bargaining, the 
individual worker can be “subsumed” within the employing undertaking but can be defined 
as an undertaking in their own right.16 
 
2.1 The existing case law 
 
Becu states that employees are not undertakings under the Treaty competition provisions.17  
Furthermore, the Court states that “even taken collectively, the registered dockers in [the] 
port area cannot be regarded as constituting an undertaking.”18  The dockers were not 
linked by a “relationship of association or by any other form of organisation which would 
support the inference that they operate on the market in dock work as an entity or as 
workers of such an entity.”19  AG Colomer goes further arguing that a workers’ collective – a 
trade union – could be regarded as an undertaking where “they conduct themselves in 
matters of trade like an entity capable of being regarded as an undertaking…”20, for example 
when “linked to other workers of that undertaking by a relationship of association.”21  
However, on the basis of information provided at the Court’s request – whether they had a 
joint management or administrative structure or whether they took the form of associations 
or corporations in order to perform tasks or ensure discipline22 – there was “at least 
                                                          
14 Ibid., [17] 
15 Case C-279/06 CEPSA Estaciones de Servicio SA v LV Tobar e Hijos SL [2008] ECR I-6681, [36]; Case 311/85 
ASBL Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v ASBL Social Dienst van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke 
Overheidsdiensten [1987] E.C.R. 3801, [19]-[20]; Bundeskartellamt v Volkswagen AG and VAG Leasing GmbH 
(Case C-266/93) [1995] E.C.R. I-3477, [19]; Case C-97/08 P  Akzo Nobel v Commission  [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, [55]; 
Alison Jones, ‘The Boundaries of an Undertaking in EU Competition Law’ (2012) 8 European Competition 
Journal 301. 
16 See Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v 
Commission [1975] E.C.R. 1663, [539] 
17 Becu, (n.2), [25]-[26]. 
18 Ibid., [27]. 
19 Ibid., [29]. 
20 Ibid., [AG57] 
21 Ibid.  One must assume that “that undertaking” refers to the trade union rather than the employer. 
22 Ibid., [AG58] 
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formally, no organisation between recognised dockers for the purposes of offering, 
concluding contracts for, and providing their services.”23   AG Colomer holds that on the 
facts of Becu the collective organisation was not:24 indeed, Colomer states that such 
discussion is beyond the facts of the preliminary reference.25 
Although Becu has been cited being authority for the point that a trade union is not 
an undertaking, this is not the case. 26  Although the Court states that even when acting 
collectively, the individual workers cannot be said to be undertakings, it does not say 
whether a trade union is or is not an undertaking.  The discussion is not whether trade 
unions are undertakings, but whether individual workers, whilst “engaged in fixed term 
contracts of employment”, are undertakings.27  The Court does not ask whether the 
collective organisation itself was an undertaking; only whether the dockers were.  There is 
no discussion as to whether, when engaged in collective negotiations, collective 
organisations (trade unions) are undertakings or even associations of undertakings.  
Furthermore, if one considers the question referred to the CJEU, and the facts of the case, 
Becu was not concerned with whether collective bargaining or agreements fall within Article 
101 TFEU.  The Court was asked whether the Royal Decree preserving a specific area of work 
for recognised dockers, with associated set pay rates: specifically, whether Article 90(1) EC 
gave rights to individual persons which were directly enforceable.28 
AG Jacobs reaches as similar conclusion to that ascribed to Becu in his opinion in 
Albany.29  He argues that a trade union, when engaged in collective bargaining, is not 
engaged in an economic activity.30  However, AG Jacobs’ reasoning differs slightly from that 
in Becu.  For Jacobs, unions act “merely as agent for employees … and not in their own right 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., [AG60]-[AG61] 
25 Ibid., [AG60] 
26 See, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, EU Social 
and Labour Rights and EU Internal Market Law, p.36 
27 Becu, (n.2) [25] 
28 Ibid., [19] 
29 The Court did not address this issue within their decision. 
30 Albany (n.1) [AG201]. What is interesting is that AG Jacobs is of the opinion that employers, when engaged 
in collective bargaining, are undertakings.  Although this is of significant academic interest, it is of practical 
insignificance when considered in light of the exemption.  The exemption removes the agreement from Article 
101’s scope, thus whether either party is an undertaking is irrelevant.  See [AG228]-[AG236] for AG Jacob’s 
reasoning. 
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… That alone suffices to show that … they are not acting as undertakings…”31  As such, a 
union is only an undertaking when carrying out an economic activity in its own right.32  
When engaged in collective bargaining a trade union is not an undertaking: collective 
bargaining is an activity attributable to its members.  Therefore, as employees/workers are 
not undertakings under EU competition law,33 a trade union, when acting for its members, is 
neither an undertaking nor association of undertakings.  The union is not acting 
independently of its members; it is an “executive organ of an agreement between its 
members.”34  This can be expanded further.  Workers are incorporated into the undertaking 
that employs them.35  Thus a union, acting as an executive organ or agent of the employees, 
is potentially incorporated into the employing undertaking as well. 
Furthermore, AG Jacobs sets out three reasons why an employee cannot be an 
undertaking.36  First, the concept of an undertaking cannot be interpreted to include 
employees.  AG Jacobs interestingly does not explain why this is.  Second, employees are a 
form of dependent labour in that they do not bear the direct risk of a transaction.  They are 
“subject to the orders of their employer.  They do not offer services to different clients, but 
work for a single employer.  For those reasons there is a significant functional difference 
between an employee and an undertaking providing services.”37  Third, and finally, AG 
Jacobs argues that EU competition law is not tailored to be applicable to employees.  
Reference within Article 101(1) TFEU to “purchase or selling price” and “trading conditions” 
does not fit with worker concerns of wages and working conditions.  To apply Article 101(1) 
TFEU would “necessitate the use of uneasy analogies between the markets for goods and 
services and labour markets.”38 
                                                          
31 Ibid., [AG227].  See also [AG222] where AG Jacobs draws a distinction between a union acting in its own 
right and as a mere organ of “an agreement between its members.” 
32 Ibid., [AG225] 
33 See Becu supra (n.2); Albany (n.1); Cases 40/73-48/73 Cooperatieve Vereniging Suiker Unie UA v Commission 
[1975] E.C.R. 1663 
34 Albany (n.1) [AG222] 
35 See Becu (n.2), [26] 
36 Albany (n.1) [AG212]-[AG216] 
37 Ibid., [AG215] 
38 Ibid., [AG216] 
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FNV Kunsten further confirms the view that a trade union is not an undertaking.39  In 
Kunsten, the Court held that a collective agreement covering self-employed workers did not 
fall within the Albany exemption.  In contrast to employees, self-employed workers are 
classified as undertakings for the purposes of EU competition law.40  Therefore, a body 
representing self-employed workers “does not act as a trade union association and 
therefore as a social partner, but, in reality, acts as an association of undertakings.”41  When 
a trade union represents self-employed workers it can “hardly be regarded as an 
‘association of employees’ … it would be difficult to consider those trade unions as 
representing ‘labour’ within the meaning referred to in Albany.”42  The key distinction, 
therefore, is the position of the individual members.  If a union member is a worker, it is not 
an association of undertakings; where the member is self-employed, it is. 
The implications of Kunsten are immediately obvious: a body representing 
employees, and carrying out negotiations on their behalf, is not an association of 
undertakings.  This must be true following Becu.43  The Courts appear to assume that an 
employee, when engaged in collective bargaining, is not an undertaking in its own right.  In 
the author’s view, this is not correct.  As will be examined below, a worker is acting outside 
his employment relationship when engaged in collective bargaining.  
 
2.2 Is the Court’s case law correct? 
 
The above case law erred in its arguments that a trade union is not an undertaking.  All the 
cases above appear to reach the conclusion that when engaged in collective bargaining, the 
union acts as its members’ agent.  AG Jacobs adopts the test of simply whether the activity 
is attributable to the union in its own right or whether it is an economic activity.  In arguing 
that the activity is attributable to the members – not the trade union – the trade union acts 
                                                          
39 In Kunsten (n.1), AG Wahl devotes considerable time discussing the distinction between workers and self-
employed.  Although of importance to the Albany exemption itself, this shall not be discussed within the paper 
as will detract from the main question being asked. 
40 Ibid., [AG30]-[AG32], [27]-[28]. 
41 Ibid., [28].  See also AG Wahl at [AG32] who states that “a trade union acting on behalf of self-employed 
persons is to be regarded as an ‘association of undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.” 
42 Ibid., [AG26].  The reference to Albany is in regard to paragraphs [55]-[60] of the decision setting out the 
exemption.  It does not refer to any argument dealing with the undertaking question. 
43 An employee is not an undertaking under EU competition law, thus a body representing employees, cannot 
be an association of undertakings. 
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as its members’ agent, AG Jacobs ignores the “proper” test for whether the entity acts as 
agent.  As set out above, in order to be an agent, the entity must have the power to 
conclude and/or negotiate contracts for the sale or purchase of goods and services of the 
principal.  Furthermore, the agent must bear no, or insignificant, financial or commercial 
risks related to the selling and/or purchasing of the contract goods or services.44  Whilst 
trade unions through collective bargaining are negotiating with the employer to “sell” the 
(continued) services of its members, they do bear significant financial risks related to 
collective bargaining.  However, such an argument does not fit easily within the previous 
case law and examples given in the Commission’s Vertical Guidance.  There are two types of 
risk to be considered when determining agency: contract-specific risks and transaction-
specific risks.45  Contract-specific risks are those directly related to the contract concluded or 
negotiated; transaction-specific risks are those which enable the agent to carry out the 
activity they are appointed to.  These are primarily sunk costs.46   
In terms of contract-specific risks, it is unclear what risks there are for individual 
workers when engaged in collective bargaining.  Financially, the only potential risk is when 
they take industrial action to try and persuade the employer to reach an agreement the 
employee considers favourable.  Where bargaining is unsuccessful, they still continue to 
work on their previous terms and conditions.  This contrasts with business transactions or 
other bargaining over services where a failure to reach an agreement can result in either the 
provision of services coming to an end or no services being provided at all.  On the other 
hand, for trade unions the financial and commercial risks are substantial in this regard.  
Where industrial action is taken – in other words, where services are withheld – trade 
unions can be liable for damages and be required to pay strike pay.  Within the UK, trade 
unions can be liable in tort for damages up to £250,000 where they have not complied with 
the very technical legal requirements for the union to call industrial action.47  This could 
substantially affect the union’s ability to engage in collective bargaining in future: they may 
                                                          
44 Vertical Guidance, [18]; CEPSA (n.13), [36] 
45 Verticals Guidance [14].  The guidance also mentions a third type of risk, risks related to activities the 
principal requires the agent perform on the same product/services market.  These risks are not present in 
regard to collective bargaining.  
46 Vertical Guidelines [14] 
47 In the UK context, see ss. 226-234A Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992; RMT v Serco 
[2011] I.R.L.R. 399; Metrobus v Unite the Union [2009] I.C.R 173.  For discussion, see generally Ruth Dukes, ‘The 
Right to Strike under UK Law: Something More than a Slogan?’ [2011] Industrial Law Journal 302; KD Ewing and 
John Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 Industrial Law Journal 2. 
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be unable to fulfil their role in protecting and representing their members in employment 
and industrial relations.  This can be seen as a contract-specific risk.  The withholding of 
services is as much a financial risk for trade unions as it is for individual members.  Such risk 
is directly linked to the “sale” of its members continued services.48 
Furthermore, there are potential transaction-related risks for the union in engaging 
in collective bargaining.  These take the form of training costs of its “negotiators”.49  This can 
be either by union employees or individual union members.  Where this is carried out by 
individual members as part of their role as either a union representative or shop steward, 
the union will need to train that member.  Such costs are unlikely to be reimbursed by an 
individual membership fee and cannot be used for other activities if the union decides to 
stop engaging in collective bargaining.  Union membership fees are to cover a whole host of 
administrative costs and other services that unions provide.  There is no separate fee for 
training costs. 
Therefore, it is argued that a union is not its member’s agent as it does assume 
significant financial risks when engaged in collective bargaining.  This is, as set out above, 
primarily through the potential cost of taking industrial action to either put pressure on the 
employer to reach a collective agreement.  In addition, there are financial risks associated 
with the provision of training to enable the union to offer collective bargaining.  Such costs 
are sunk costs and are not reimbursed by the principal (the individual members) as such.  
The union charges a set fee which is partially linked to its (expected) costs, but based on the 
individual member’s income. 
 
2.3 But what if the union is its members’ agent? 
 
However, even where the union acts as its members’ agent, this does not mean that the 
employee is not an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining.  Under Becu, a 
worker is not an undertaking for the purposes of competition law as when engaged under a 
contract of employment the individual worker is subsumed within the employing 
                                                          
48 Industrial action is a vital component to the right to collective bargaining.  Without industrial action, 
collective bargaining is no more than collective begging.  See, for example, Case C-438/05 International 
Transport Workers’ Federation v Viking Line ABP [2008] 1 C.M.L.R. 51; Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet [2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 9 
49 See Vertical Guidelines [16], where training of personnel is listed as a market-specific investment. 
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undertaking.  This appears to be AG Jacobs’ concern in Albany.  His first two concerns relate 
to acts done in the service of the employer.  Where a worker is acting outside that 
employment relationship, they are not subsumed within the employer’s undertaking, and 
can potentially be held to be an undertaking in their own right.50  When involved in 
collective bargaining they are acting against the company: they are generally in conflict with 
the company’s interests.  The workers are not acting on their employer’s behalf, thus cannot 
be “subsumed” within the employing undertaking.  They are bargaining for improved terms 
and conditions: in effect, offering their continued services – their labour – under new terms 
and conditions.  In extremis, this could be accompanied by a threat to quit and or industrial 
action.   
Furthermore, it has been argued that employees should be treated as undertakings 
in their own right. 51  “[W]e would treat such individuals if they were independently 
commercially exploiting their goods or services, as consultants.”52  Although very impactful 
in that all workers can be exposed to competition law, this is unlikely to be the case: 
individual employees will not normally have appreciable market power, thus Article 101 and 
102 TFEU will not apply.53  If this were the case, any trade union would be either an 
association of undertakings or subsumed into its members’ undertaking.   
 
 2.4 Summary 
 
In summary, the above has argued that the previous decisional practice of the Court 
is incorrect.  A trade union does not act as its members’ agent when engaged in collective 
bargaining: there are potentially significant financial risks to the union when engaged in 
collective bargaining.  Therefore, a trade union can be an undertaking for the purposes of 
EU competition law.  In the following sections, this paper shall examine whether a trade 
union is an undertaking or not. 
 
                                                          
50 See Paul Nihoul, ‘Do Workers Constitute Undertakings for the Purposes of the Competition Rules?’ [2000] 
European Law Review 408, 413–4.  Although Nihoul is talking about the subordination present within the 
employment relationship, there is no problem in thinking wider.  Collective bargaining, in providing 
countervailing power, augurs against a form of subordination. 
51 Townley, Christopher (n 55) 14–16. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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3. Is a trade union an undertaking?  
 
An undertaking is defined as an “entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the 
legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.”54  Whether an entity is an 
undertaking depends on the “industrial and commercial nature of the activity.”55  EU 
competition rules do not apply to an activity “which, by its nature, its aim and the rules to 
which it is subject does not belong to the sphere of economic activity … or which is 
connected with the exercise of the powers of a public authority.”56   Where the entity is 
engaged in an economic activity, the entity in question is an undertaking for the purposes of 
the Treaty competition provisions.  In Pavlov, it was held that an economic activity consists 
of offering goods and services on a given market.57  This definition has been given a wide 
interpretation.  In Spanish Courier Services, for example, the Spanish Post Office was held to 
be an undertaking on the basis that it provided services on a given market.58   Similarly in 
Ambulanz Glockner, the provision of ambulance services for remuneration was an 
undertaking for the purposes of competition law.59  That the provider had public service 
obligations did not prevent such a finding.60   
In assessing whether an activity is an economic activity, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (“CJEU”) takes a functional approach.  An entity can be an undertaking 
when carrying out one activity but not when carrying out another.61  For example, in SELEX, 
                                                          
54 Case C-41/90 Hofner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, [21].  See also AG Jacobs in Albany, 
(n.1); Cases C-180-184/98 Pavlov v Stichting Pensionefonds Medische Specialisten [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 1.  See 
also, Article 1 of Protocol 22 EEA which defines an undertaking as “any entity carrying out activities of a 
commercial or economic nature.”  See also, Woulter Wils, ‘The Undertaking as a Subject of E.C. Competition 
Law and the Imputation of Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons’ (2000) 25 European law Review 99; 
Jones (n 16); Arved Deringer, The Competition Law of the European Community (Commerce Clearing House, 
New York 1968) 5–6; Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law : Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford, 
United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, [2014] Fifth edition 2014); Richard Whish and David Bailey, 
Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press) 2012).  
55 Case 118/85 Re Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato: E.C. Commission v Italy [1988] 3 CMLR 
255, per AG Mischo 
56 Case C-309/99 Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 27, 
57 Pavlov (n.54), [75] 
58 [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 560 
59 Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glockner v Landkreis Sudwestpfalz [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 21; [19]-[22] 
60 Ibid., [21] 
61 See Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID v Greece [2009] 5 C.M.L.R. 11. “The 
classification as an activity falling within the exercise of public powers or as an economic entity must be carried 
out separately for each activity to be exercised by a given entity.” [7]; See also Case C-264/01 AOK 
Bundesverband v Ichtyol Gesellschaft Cordes [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 22, [AG25], [AG45], [58] 
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the General Court held that some of Eurocontrol’s activities, for example, setting technical 
standards and managing intellectual property rights, were not economic, however, some 
other activities, for example, the provision of technical assistance, were economic 
activities.62  This paper, therefore, shall focus solely on collective bargaining.  Whilst trade 
unions have diversified beyond their original functions,63  this has no influence on whether a 
trade union is an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining. 
 
 3.1. Is collective bargaining an economic activity? 
 
An economic activity is defined as “consisting in offering goods or services on a given 
market…”64  Trade unions, when engaged in collective bargaining, do offer services on a 
given market.65  Trade unions, specifically within the UK, do not engage in collective 
bargaining unless they have members within a given firm.  In return for subscription fees, 
the union will bargain on its members’ behalf.  Without members there is no incentive for 
trade unions to engage in collective bargaining, nor does it make economic sense for them 
to do so.  At a rudimentary level, the union supplies its services in collective bargaining in 
return for membership fees.  Within the UK’s industrial relations setting, a trade union will 
not engage in collective bargaining absent members.  Although a union can engage in 
collective bargaining for altruistic reasons,66 this does not alter the outcome.  Although such 
altruistic reasons may make such a provider less competitive, such reasons do not affect the 
provision of services on a given market. 
                                                          
62 Case T-155/04 SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 1096, [90].  Although the CJEU 
disagreed with the GC’s classification on appeal, it did not question the approach taken; see Case C-113/07 P 
[2009] 4 C.M.L.R. 1083, [77]-[79] 
63 Albany (n.1) [AG226].  For example, some trade unions now operate supermarkets, savings banks, travel 
agencies and other forms of business.  Unite, on their website, state that “many unions have agreements with 
third parties for additional benefits, such as cheaper insurance and discounts”.  These are solely for their 
members.  < http://www.unitetheunion.org/how-we-
help/whybecomeamember/tradeunionsknowyourfactsfromthefiction/> [last accessed 19/11/2016, 11.30] 
64 Pavlov, (n.54)., [AG107], [75]; see also Case 118/85 Commission v Italy [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 255 
65 In Case C-319/07 P 3F (formerly Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark (SID)) v Commission of the European 
Communities [2009] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, the Court, at [52] states that a trade union “is an economic operator which 
negotiates the terms and conditions on which labour is provided to undertakings”.  
66 See, for example, Bob Hepple, The Making of Labour Law in Europe (Mansell; London 1986) 11; Otto Kahn-
Freund and others, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (London : Stevens, 1983 3rd ed / by Paul Davies, Mark 
Freedland 1983) 1, 7. 
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Furthermore, the trade union must bear the financial/economic risks associated with 
collective bargaining.67  If the trade union is unsuccessful in collective bargaining, its 
members can go elsewhere.  As stated by AG Colomer, “[i]t is the ability to take on financial 
risks which gives an operator sufficient significance to be capable of being regarded as an 
entity genuinely engaged in trade, that is to say to be regarded as an undertaking.  In other 
words, recognition as an ‘undertaking’ requires, at least, the existence of an identifiable 
centre to which economically significant decisions can be attributed.”68   It is arguable that 
the trade union bear the financial risks of collective bargaining.  The union has a financial 
incentive to achieve a favourable outcome.  If collective bargaining is successful, the union 
has potential financial gains through attracting new members.  A union with a good record 
of attaining benefits for its members is more attractive than one that does not.  In contrast, 
a union that ‘fails’ in collective bargaining runs the risk of losing members.  Members can 
leave the union, possibly seeking out another union who may achieve better results.  As the 
main revenue source of financial income for unions is through their members’ subscription 
fees,69 a loss of members has financial repercussions.  Thus, collective bargaining has a 
significant financial risk for unions. 
Finally, the activity must, at least in principle, be capable of being carried on by a 
private undertaking on order to make a profit.70  As AG Jacobs states, “the basic test 
appears … to be whether it could, at least in principle, be carried on by a private undertaking 
in order to make profits.”71  It is irrelevant that the entity lacks a motivation to create 
                                                          
67 See Pavlov (n.54), where the Court held that an undertaking must “assume the financial risks attached to the 
pursuit of the activity.” [76] 
68 Becu, (n.2) [AG53]-[AG54] 
69 For example, out of Unite the Unions’ £165,424 annual income, £153,839 was generated from membership 
subscriptions; see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/538434/795T_2015.pdf [last 
accessed 30/08/2016, 12.51]; out of UNISON’s £201,724 annual income, £158,304 was from its members. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/528258/736T_2015.pdf [last 
accessed 30/08/2016, 12.54] 
70 Albany, (n.1) Pavlov (n.54), AOK Bundesverband (n.61) [AG59], “If there were no possibility of a private 
undertaking carrying on a given undertaking, there would be no purpose in applying the competition rules to 
it.”; Okeoghene Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law : The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford ; New York : 
Oxford University Press 2006). 
71 AOK Bundesverband (n.61) [AG27].  See also Case C-364/92 Sat Fluggesellschaft mbH v European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 208, [AG9].  Ag Tesauro states that the 
possibility to make a profit is “the essential factor in classifying a body as an undertaking…” 
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profit,72 or does not have any economic purpose.73  That there is the possibility is sufficient.  
As applied to collective bargaining, it is irrelevant whether a trade union makes a profit from 
collective bargaining.  That there is the potential to make a profit is key. 
It is possible for profit to be made through offering services for the purposes of 
collective bargaining.  Trade unions do not offer their bargaining services for free.74  
Although there are free-riders, in that the outcome of collective bargaining is normally 
applied to non-members as well as members, a significant proportion of those benefiting 
from collective bargaining will be fully paid members.  Trade unions can set membership 
subscriptions at a level at which it is possible for them to operate at a profit.  That trade 
unions do not, does not alter this conclusion.  This follows the decisional practice of the 
CJEU.  In Ambulanz Glockner, for example, it was argued that there was nothing about the 
nature of providing emergency or patient transport that necessitated that it be carried out 
by public entities.75  Such an activity could in principle be carried out for a profit, thus was an 
undertaking under EU competition law.  Although collective bargaining must be carried out 
by a trade union,76 there is no prohibition against unions making a profit through collective 
bargaining: it is entirely a matter for a trade union to set the level of fees applicable.77 
Therefore, when engaged in collective bargaining, a trade union is, prima facie, an 
undertaking for the purposes of EU competition law in its own right.  It provides services, 
collective bargaining, on the market, bears the financial risks involved, and has the potential 
to make a profit.  However, there are potential arguments against this argument.  These 
focus on, first, whether collective bargaining is a public function (section 4), and second, 
whether collective bargaining is a solidarity function (section 5).   
 
4. Is collective bargaining a public function? 
 
                                                          
72 Cases 209/78 etc. Van Landewyck v Commission [1980] E.C.R. 3125, [88]; Distribution of Package Tours 
During the 1990 World Cup [1992] O.J. L 326/31, [43] 
73 Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze [2006] E.C.R. I-289, [123] 
74 See (n.67) for the proportion of income made by trade unions. 
75 Ambulanz Glockner (n.59), [AG68] 
76 See section 178, Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
77 Ibid.  AG Jacobs states that in regard to the transport services whether profit is made depends on the cost 
set by the operator for his services.  The same applies in regard to collective bargaining. 
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If collective bargaining can be defined as a public function, it will not fall within the 
definition of an economic activity.  Activities connected with the exercise of public powers 
are not of an economic nature and thus do not classify as an undertaking.78 In Bodson, the 
CJEU held that Article 101 did not apply to “contracts for concessions concluded between 
communes acting in their capacity as public authorities and undertakings entrusted with the 
provision of a public service.”79  Furthermore, in Cali, the Court held that an entity acts in 
the exercise of official authority where a task is in the public interest and forms part of the 
essential functions of the state, and, “is connected by its nature, its aims and the rules to 
which it is subject with the exercise of public powers…”80 
 First, it is possible that collective bargaining can be the exercise of public powers.  
Collective bargaining is always in the public interest: strong worker representation and 
regulation of the employment relationship is a good thing.  Second, where labour relations 
are characterised by collective laissez faire and/or abstentionism, collective bargaining plays 
a regulatory role, forming an essential function of the state. 81  Collective bargaining in 
regulating the employment relationship in terms of setting terms and conditions, ensures 
that worker voice is heard and preventing exploitation of workers.  In the absence of state 
regulation of labour relations and the employment relationship, collective bargaining is 
strongly in the public interest and arguably forms part of the essential functions of state.  A 
good example of this is seen in the German model collective bargaining.  In German 
industrial relations, collective bargaining sets industry standards.  Collective agreements set 
wages and terms and conditions of employment for all workers in a given sector.  A good 
example of this is that prior to 2015, there was no statutory minimum wage within 
Germany.  Wage regulation was the sole prerogative of the collective bargaining regime.  
This form of collective bargaining fits more closely with Bodson and Cali.  In Cali, for 
example, the private enterprise was entrusted with carrying out anti-pollution surveillance 
in Genoa. In a collective bargaining model such as in Germany, the social partners, trade 
                                                          
78 See, eg,  Wouters (n.56) 
79 Case C-30/87 Bodson v Pompes Funebres des Regions Liberees SA [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 984, [18] 
80 Case C-343/95 Deigo Cali & Figli SRL v Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova [1997] 5 C.M.L.R. 484, [23] 
81 For discussion on this, see Kahn-Freund and others (n 67); Lord Wedderburn, ‘Freedom of Association and 
Philosophies of Labour Law’ (1989) 18 Industrial Law Journal 1; Keith Ewing, ‘The Function of Trade Unions’ 
(2005) 34 Industrial Law Journal 1. 
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unions and employers’ associations, are entrusted with the regulation of the employment 
relationship through collective bargaining.  
This, however, is missing from the model in this paper – and UK collective 
bargaining.  Whilst the legislative framework is supportive of collective bargaining, this is 
not to the extent seen in Germany.  Collective bargaining is free to set terms and conditions 
of employment, but is not entrusted with the regulation of the employment relationship.  
Whilst collective bargaining still has a regulatory function over employment relationships, 
this is not “granted” by the state, as understood in competition law.  In Bodson and Cali, the 
activities were carried out in pursuance of their powers granted under statute.82  This is not 
present within the UK collective bargaining regime.  Thus, collective bargaining within a UK 
context, is not the exercise of public powers. 
 
5. Solidarity  
 
The CJEU has held that entities adopting a solidarity function are not undertakings for the 
purposes of the Treaty competition provisions.83  Where collective bargaining can be 
defined as a solidarity activity, then a trade union, when engaged in collective bargaining, is 
not an undertaking (or association of undertakings) under EU competition law.  Solidarity is 
defined as “the redistribution of income between those who are better off and those who, 
in view of their resources … would be deprived”,84 and, “the inherently uncommercial act of 
involuntary subsidisation of one special group by another.”85  However, cases involving 
solidarity have been few and far between,86 and have all concerned insurance and pension 
schemes.  For example, in Poucet, funds managing the sickness and maternity insurance 
scheme for self-employed individuals in non-agricultural occupations were not undertakings 
                                                          
82 The same applies in Cali e Figli (n.80) 
83 See, eg, Case C-159-160/91 Poucet v Assurance Generales de France and Caisse Muituelle Regionale du 
Languedoc-Roussillon [1993] E.C.R. I-637; Case C-244/94 Federation Francaise des Societes d’Assurance v 
Ministere de l’Agriculture et de la Peche [1995] E.C.R I-4013; Case C-238/94 Jose Garcia v Mutuelle de 
Prevoyance Sociale d’Aquitaine [1996] E.C.R. I-1673.  The author is unaware of any Treaty provisions on this 
solidarity function. 
84 Ibid., [10] 
85 Case C-70/95 Sodemare SA v Regione Lombardia [1997] E.C.R. I-3395, [AG29].  See also AG Jacobs in AOK 
Bundesverband (n.61) [AG32] 
86 In a search of Eur-lex using the terms “solidarity” AND “Poucet”, only 48 results were found.  This included 
cases unrelated to both the competition and free movement provisions. 
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due to the solidarity function they carried out.87  The scheme was “intended to provide 
cover for all the persons to whom they apply, against the risks of sickness, old age, death 
and invalidity, regardless of their financial state and their state of health at the time of 
affiliation.”88   
Furthermore, the exemption for solidarity functions is based on the view that social 
programmes should be protected “from the Community’s economic law.”89  Competition 
law “recognises national solidarity as the political expression a set of obligations citizens 
wish to extend towards one another.”90  Where it is demonstrated that such an obligation 
was essential for the achievement of the social goal, through the use of a system of 
redistribution based on solidarity rather than market activity, this will be respected by the 
Court.  Competition law will not apply.91  
The CJEU has been consistent in its assessment of whether a specific activity can be 
classified as a solidarity function.92  In doing so, the CJEU will look at the activity as a whole, 
including the way in entity carrying out such an activity.  From the CJEU case law, we can 
distil 6 key factors that the Court will consider in answering this question.  The Court will 
look at (1) the objective being pursued; (2) the nature of the activity; (3) the manner in 
which contributions and benefits are calculated and managed; (4) the overall degree of 
state control; (5) the activities’ redistributive aspects; and (6) the existence of competing 
entities.  These factors are not cumulative; the Court will balance arguments and factors in 
favour and against solidarity.93  The following discussion, therefore, will focus on the above 
factors, examining how they apply to collective bargaining.   
 
                                                          
87 Poucet (n.83), [8]. The complaint challenged the orders that they pay contributions to the scheme and that 
the complainants should be free to approach any insurance provider in the Community and not be subject to 
the unilateral rules of the provider in question.  See also the schemes in Albany (n.1); Case C-350/07 Kattner 
Stahlbau GmbH v Maschinenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft [2009] E.C.R. I-1513; Case C-218/00 Cisal 
di Battistello Venanzio & C. Sas v Instituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortune sul lavoro (INAIL) 
[2002] E.C.R. I-691 
88 Ibid., [9] 
89 Nina Boeger, ‘Solidarity and EC Competition Law’ [2007] European Law Review 319, 324. 
90 Ibid., p.338 
91 Ibid., p.338-9 
92 See Federation Francaise, (n.83) [17]-[21], INAIL (n.87), Albany (n.1), and case law cited within. 
93 Ibid., [19]-[21].  Here the Court held that the principle of capitalisation and linkage of benefits to 
contributions outweighed the other factors in favour. 
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5.1 Does the solidarity principle apply here? 
 
In applying these criteria to collective bargaining, there are several factors strongly in favour 
of holding that collective bargaining performs a solidarity function.  First, collective 
bargaining clearly has a social objective.  It seeks to improve the social and economic 
position of its members.  Its purpose is not to make a profit, but is aimed at protecting and 
furthering worker interests through redistributive measures.  This is evident from case law 
establishing collective bargaining as a fundamental right protected under Article 11 ECHR.94  
Collective bargaining, according to the ECtHR, is “an essential means to promote and secure 
the interests of its members.”95  It is not an economic activity for trade unions, but an 
exercise of social solidarity.   
This, when linked with the second and fifth factors – the nature of the activity and its 
redistributive qualities – argues in favour of collective bargaining being a solidarity activity.  
Collective bargaining is a form of countervailing power against the employer.96  It is to 
provide protection for employees and, as already stated, improve their working terms and 
conditions.  Furthermore, collective bargaining has a redistributive nature and function, 
aiming to improve the position of its members, generally at the cost of its members’ 
employer(s).  In wage bargaining, the collective bargaining redistributes rents in favour of 
the employee: wage bargaining is all about redistribution of rents. 
Additionally, there is no link between the contributions paid and the benefits 
received under collective bargaining.  Contributions vary according to the level of income an 
individual receives, yet there is no differentiation as to the benefits received from collective 
bargaining.  Furthermore, benefits also accrue to those who are not union members, 
common to the UK tradition of collective bargaining.97  Therefore, no principle of 
capitalisation, as shown in Federation Francaise,98 is present, thus strongly indicative of a 
solidarity function.   
                                                          
94 See Demir (n.7) 
95 Ibid., [157] 
96 John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism : The Concept of Countervailing Power. (London : Hamilton 
1961). 
97 See Poucet (n.83) and Federation Francaise (n.83) whereby in some cases there was no contributions to the 
fund yet still had access to the benefits payable under them.  In a sense bargaining is not based on the 
principle of capitalisation. 
98 The benefits received are not linked to the contributions made and the financial results of the investments 
made. 
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Moreover, the non-compulsory nature of trade union membership has little weight 
against finding that collective bargaining is a solidarity function.  Within the UK closed shops 
are unenforceable,99 and in addition to the right to join a union, there is a corresponding 
negative right not to be a member.100  The presence of free-riders points towards a 
solidarity function, when considered in light of the nature and purpose of collective 
bargaining, strongly leads towards the conclusion that collective bargaining is a solidarity 
function.101  Everyone covered by the collective agreement benefits from it: collective 
bargaining has a compulsory effect, even though not compulsory in nature.    
However, there are strong arguments against collective bargaining being a solidarity 
function.  First, there are differences between what the CJEU case law has identified as 
solidarity functions under competition law and the social function performed by trade 
unions.  The nature of the activities differs considerably.  The cases involving solidarity and 
social protection concern the implementation and payment of state benefits and 
pensions.102  These are largely public functions carried out by a public or quasi-public body.  
In contrast, and as set out in section 4 above, collective bargaining is not a public function.  
At best, one can argue that there is a duty on the state to facilitate and enable certain trade 
union functions,103 there is no “right to prevail”.  An employer can be forced to bargain – or 
at best, forced to go through a process – but not to reach an agreement.  One can therefore 
draw a distinction between the solidarity cases and collective bargaining.  In the cases 
where the activity was a solidarity function, redistribution was guaranteed.  The “process” 
always reached a positive outcome.   Under collective bargaining, there is no guaranteed 
redistribution or “positive” outcome.  Collective bargaining can, and does, frequently reach 
                                                          
99 See ss.137 and 152 TURLCA which prevent enforcement of both pre and post-entry closed shops.  See, also, 
ss.145A, 146 TURLCA.  In RJ Harvey, Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law. (Butterworths 2001)., 
it is argued that the Human Rights Act 1998, in incorporating Article 11 of the ECHR into UK law, “virtually 
guarantees that a closed shop may not be lawfully maintained.” NI.11.A.3[3107]; see also [3133]-[3135].  For 
an ECHR perspective, see Sørensen and Rasmussen v Denmark (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 572 
100 Article 11 ECHR gives the right to join a trade union, and has been interpreted, albeit controversially, as 
giving the freedom to join a union, which therefore assumes that there is a freedom not to join a union.  One 
can interpret this to prevent compulsion to join a union as well.  See the corresponding rights in Young, James 
and Webster v United Kingdom [1981] I.R.L.R. 408; ASLEF v United Kingdom [2007] I.R.L.R. 361.  See also 
Sorensen v Denmark (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 572. 
101 Even in Germany where by law the benefits of a collective agreement only accrue to union members, 
employers will still extend the benefits to non-members. 
102 See, for example, Poucet (n.36), AOK Bundesverband (n.15) 
103 The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 places various duties on the employer to 
recognise, provide bargaining information and consult, for example, with the employer. 
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no concrete outcome.  The employee, and trade union, can be in the same position many 
years after commencing collective bargaining. 
Furthermore, whilst there is a redistributive element in collective bargaining, there is 
no “involuntary subsidisation” of one group by another.  The employer makes a voluntary 
choice to increase wages.104  Looking at the CJEU case law make this distinction clearer.  The 
insurance/sickness funds found to operate on a solidarity basis all operated via either inter-
generational subsidisation105 and/or compulsory subsidisation between entities.106  Such 
redistribution is not generally present in collective bargaining.  Although collective 
agreements setting up social security schemes, such as in Albany, do this, a simple wage 
agreement does not.  It operates to improve the wages of those currently employed by a 
specific employer.  However, when viewed from a German collective bargaining model, this 
argument falls away.  Where sectoral wage bargaining occurs to set wages, the agreed upon 
wages apply across the board regardless of whether the individual employer agrees.  Even if 
the employer leaves the employers’ association, they are still bound by the collective 
agreement until its expiry.107  This, however, does not occur under a decentralised model, 
typical of much collective bargaining in the UK. 
Furthermore, there is, prima facie, the potential for competing unions.  Although 
competition is allowed so far as it does not affect the actual accrued benefits,108 
competition between unions when engaged in collective bargaining has the potential to 
affect the actual accrued benefits.  Competition between unions can prevent 
counterbalancing power against the employer being brought, and can render collective 
bargaining illusory.  Employers, averse to collective bargaining, could play one union off 
against the other rendering any outcomes either significantly less beneficial or indeed 
                                                          
104 Note that this includes situations where the employer concedes to the union demands following concerted 
industrial action. 
105 Poucet (n.83), [12] 
106 Poucet (n.83), Federation Francaise (n.83). 
107 Note that conformity with the collectively agreed terms is prominent within the non-unionised sector.  
Firms not belonging to employers’ association generally follow the collective agreed terms.  See, for example, 
Heinz Tüselmann and Arne Heise, ‘The German Model of Industrial Relations at the Crossroads: Past, Present 
and Future’ (2000) 31 Industrial Relations Journal 162, 164; Stephen J Silvia, Holding the Shop Together: 
German Industrial Relations in the Postwar Era (ILR Press, an imprint of Cornell University Press 2013). 
108 AOK Bundesverband (n.61), [56].  The Court held that competition was restricted solely to contributions and 
to attract members.  This did not deviate from the solidarity function as this had not effect on the overall 
benefits or the nature of the scheme.  The aim, as accepted by the Court, was to “encourage the sickness 
funds to operate in accordance with principles of sound management that is to say in the most effective and 
least costly manner possible, in the interests of the proper functioning of the German social security system.” 
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illusory.109   As such, competition between unions is generally discouraged by trade union 
associations.  Within the UK, competition is muted by affiliation to the TUC.110  This, 
however, has not stopped inter-union competition from occurring.111   
However, the strongest argument against collective bargaining as a solidarity 
function is the possibility of it being carried out with a view to making a profit.  As Sinclair 
states, in many social/public cases, there is no commercial provision of services, nor is one 
possible.112  The body carrying out the solidarity activity does not profit from such activities.  
As argued in section 3.1, there is nothing preventing a trade union making a, or seeking to, 
profit from collective bargaining.  There is no legal impediment to a trade union adopting 
such an approach, nor is there any inter-union subsidy.  As collective bargaining can be 
carried out with a view to a profit, it is an economic activity, not a solidarity function. 
 
 5.2 Summary 
 
Overall, trade unions, when engaged in collective bargaining, are not carrying out a 
solidarity function.  Whilst it is accepted that the aim of improving terms and conditions of 
employment through redistributive methods is clearly of a social nature, this is negated by 
the consideration that collective bargaining can, in theory, be conducted for the purposes of 
profit-making.  Collective bargaining can be a commercial activity.  As AG Tesauro states, an 
economic activity is something “which, could at least in principle, be carried on by a private 
undertaking in order to make a profit”.113  As collective bargaining can be carried out with a 
view to a profit, it is an economic, not a solidarity, function.  Thus, a trade union when 
engaged in collective bargaining does not fall within the solidarity principle.  
                                                          
109 However, this does depend on what the “benefit” of collective bargaining is.  If it is the representational 
aspect that is the benefit, then competition will not undermine this function.  Indeed, it may enhance it.  
However, if one views the outcome as the benefit, then the opposite is possible.  Competition may undermine 
its redistributive function. 
110 Note that TUC members are subject to the TUC Dispute Principles and Procedures which prevent 
competition for members unless agreed in advance or with the TUC’s permission (Principle 2) and prevent 
unions from seeking to organise within organisation where another TUC member is present unless certain 
conditions are met (Principle 3). 
111 See for example, the dispute between Serco and Community, Appendix 4, 2013 TUC General Council 
Report, http://www.tuc.org.uk/about-tuc/congress/congress-2013/tuc-congress-2013-general-council-report 
[accessed 18/02/2015]. 
112 Duncan Sinclair, ‘“Undertakings” in Competition Law at the Public-Private Interface - an Unhealthy 
Situation’ [2014] European Competition Law Review 167, 170. 
113 Poucet (n.83), [AG8] 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The above arguments reach the conclusion that a trade union, when engaged in collective 
bargaining, is an undertaking, or association of undertakings, for the purposes of EU 
competition law.  On a strict application of competition law, the paper argues that collective 
bargaining is an economic activity.  Therefore, Article 101 TFEU can apply to collective 
agreements.  Trade unions offer collective bargaining on a given market – the labour market 
– with collective bargaining potentially being carried out for with a view to making a profit.  
Furthermore, the trade union also bears the financial risk of collective bargaining.   
 Such an argument differs from the existing case law.  The existing case law, as set 
out in section 2, argues that a trade union acts as its members’ agent when engaged in 
collective bargaining.  As such, it cannot be an undertaking.  However, this paper argues that 
this is not correct.    Although trade unions are “selling” their members’ services, the trade 
union has significant financial risks when engaged in collective bargaining.  Where members 
withhold their services in order to strengthen their bargaining position, their trade union 
can be liable for damages where they fail to comply with legislative requirements.  Such 
considerations are fatal to the view that trade unions are their members’ agent under EU 
competition law.  
 Furthermore, the paper has argued that collective bargaining is not a public function.  
Collective bargaining as a form of regulating the employment relationship is not entrusted 
to the social partners by the state, but is an accompaniment to the regulatory framework.   
In addition, collective bargaining is not a solidarity function.  Whilst collective bargaining 
satisfies several of the solidarity factors established in the case law, collective bargaining 
cannot be classified as such.  The potential to make a profit creates a significant outweighing 
argument, as a solidarity function is generally seen as being incompatible with the ability to 
make a profit.   
 
